
New Hampshire 



Battle of Bunker Hill. 




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I'RRSRNTi:!") BY 



NEW HAMPSHIRE 

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BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL 



An Address Delivered before the New Hampshire Society of Sons 
OF THE American Revolution at Concord, N. H., June 14, 1902, 



BY 

HENRY M. BAKER. 



fustitia et Praeterea Nihil. 



CONCORD, N. H. : 

THE RUMFORD FKE55. 

1903. 



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NEW HAMPSHIRE AT BUNKER HILL 



Mr. President, Compatriots , Ladies, and Gentlemen : 

The battle of Bunker hill was the morning star of independence 
and national freedom — the herald of a new nation. There had been 
prior armed resistance to British power and aggression, of which the 
capture of Fort William and Mary by citizens of New Hampshire, and 
the defense of their homes and property by the yeomanry of Massa- 
chusetts at Lexington and Concord, were notable and pregnant 
examples, but nowhere, before the 17th of June, 1775, had there 
been any conflict which committed the colonists to revolution or com- 
bination to maintain their rights under the crown, or which deter- 
mined their capacity to successfully withstand the attacks of dis- 
ciplined royal troops under the command of generals who had gained 
renown on European battle-fields. 

A little army of patriots, scarcely organized and almost wholly 
undisciplined, had gathered around Boston to prevent the British 
soldiery which occupied the town from attempting further incursions 
to destroy military stores and harass the people. The two armies 
were too close together to remain quiet or to keep from bloodshed. 
The British were restricted upon the land side to the town of Boston, 
and the colonists were not secure in their positions. Inevitably each 
army would try to improve its situation and condition. Word had 
reached the patriots that the British intended to seize and fortify 
Bunker hill and Dorchester heights. Thereupon the committee of 
safety of the Massachusetts provincial congress recommended to the 
council of war that the Americans take possession of Bunker Hill and 
fortify it. It was done. The British attempted to dislodge them. 
The battle was fought. A step was taken which could not be re- 
traced, and Bunker hill became a word of glory. 

Though the colonists were defeated and driven from their fortifica- 
tions with considerable loss in both killed and wounded, sustained 
principally during their retreat, and about thirty of their number were 
prisoners of war, yet the victory was won with much greater loss. 

A few more similar victories would have annihilated the British 
army. The moral effect of vicfory remained with the Americans, and 
the British were astounded and disheartened. The one had learned 
that he could successfully withstand the veterans of England, the 
other that the Americans could and would fight, and that they were 



4 Neiv Hampshire at Bunker Hill. 

brave and efficient, though unskilled in the arts of war. The result 
was wholly favorably to the patriot cause. The colonists became 
more united in their opposition to oppression, and more ready to 
defend their rights. From New Hampshire to Georgia the response 
was prompt, patriotic, enthusiastic, determined. In a few hours the 
whole situation had changed. War was present, defense inevitable, 
and liberty possible, only at the price of revolution and life. 

A brief sketch of the events preceding the battle and of the 
engagement itself seems appropriate. 

The New England colonists were men of character and determina- 
tion. They believed they did not cease to be Englishmen when they 
left England and acquired homes in her colonies, and, hence, that 
they were entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities which 
pertain to the Englishman at home. Their free life in America had 
enlarged their estimate of personal liberty. They held that the people 
were the rightful source of power, and, therefore, that representation 
vpas a necessary prerequisite to lawful taxation. So, when parliament 
passed the Stamp Act, requiring stamps to be affixed to almost every 
public or legal document used in the colonies, and declared them 
invalid when unstamped, assessed a tax on tea and other commodi- 
ties, declared colonial ports closed to foreign and domestic trade, even 
limited their right to trial by jury drawn from the vicinage, and the 
right to assemble peacefully to discuss and act upon public matters, 
when writs of assistance were issued, charters revoked, governors 
removed without just cause, soldiers quartered upon private citizens 
without necessity or compensation, and when foreign soldiers had 
shot unarmed citizens in the public streets, is it any wonder that a 
spirit of unrest, beginning with the first encroachments upon the 
rights of freemen, turned to anxiety, distrust, and hatred, and then 
to armed resistance? 

The country was excited and apprehensive. So, when the lantern 
shone from the belfry of the old North church and Paul Revere 
started upon his midnight ride, his note of warning and call to duty 
were not unexpected. The response was so enthusiastic and com- 
plete that an ever-increasing number of patriots harassed the British 
upon their return from Lexington and Concord. They were so hard 
pressed that reinforcements were sent to their aid. Had the distance 
been greater or the retreat less hasty, nothing could have saved them 
from capture or death. Wherever the news of the British raid came 
patriot hearts beat in sympathy with their suffering brethren, and 
from neighboring towns to the mountains of New Hampshire and the 



New Hampshire at Bitnker Hill. 5 

seashores of Connecticut brave men rushed to the defense of their 
principles and liberty, until thousands surrounded Boston and held 
the British there so securely that they never attempted to raise the 
siege, and eventually evacuated the town by sea. 

The British forces in Boston during April were about four thou- 
sand. Reinforcements soon came, so that at the time of the battle 
of Bunker hill they numbered, including those on armed vessels, fully 
eleven thousand men. They were commanded by General Thomas 
Gage, an officer of experience and bravery. 

The total number of Americans then encamped about Boston may 
have slightly exceeded that number. There were no professional 
soldiers among them. They were volunteers in the strictest sense of 
that word, and brought with them their muskets, which were of dif- 
ferent calibers and hence not adapted to the use of prepared car- 
tridges. Some of them were not organized in any formal way, but 
generally they were in companies and regiments. There were no 
brigades or divisions. They wore no prescribed uniforms, and few, if 
any, of the soldiers had them. There was no recognized flag, and it 
is not probable that any flag floated over either the redoubt or the 
rail fence during the battle. 

The French and Indian wars had taught them something of the 
discipline and much of the dangers of military life. They knew they 
could successfully resist the soldiers of France, but they had been 
accustomed to regard the royal troops of England as superior soldiers 
and almost invincible. Some of the colonies had appointed generals 
to command their troops. Israel Putnam held a commission as a 
general, but was in command of a regiment only. Massachusetts had 
several generals, but General Artemus Ward was in command of her 
troops around Boston. New Hampshire had appointed Nathaniel 
Folsom general, and John Stark, Enoch Poor, and James Reed 
colonels. General Folsom and Colonel Poor were in New Hamp- 
shire. Colonel Stark's regiment was encamped at Medford, and 
Colonel Reed's men were near Charlestown Neck. Both Stark and 
Reed had reported to General Ward, whose headquarters were at 
Cambridge, and they received orders from him. 

The committee of safety held a meeting on the 15 th of June, and 
determined that ''Whereas it appears- of importance to the safety of 
the colony that possession of the hill called Bunker's Hill in Charles- 
town be securely kept and defended ; . . . therefore, Resolved, 
unanimously, that it be recommended to the council of war that the 
above mentioned Bunker Hill be maintained by sufficient force being 



6 New Hampshire at Bunker Hill. 

posted there, . . ." and appointed a committee to communicate 
their decision to the council of war, and to consult with the general 
officers over matters of importance. 

A council of war was held the next day. It is not known who 
composed this council officially, or what persons were present by 
invitation or otherwise. It is reasonably certain that Generals Ward, 
Putnam, Warren, and Pomeroy were there, and, if not originally 
present, it is very probable that Colonel Prescott was soon called in 
and informed that he had been selected to command the party to 
sieze and fortify the hill. 

There were five hills on the peninsular of Charlestown, which is 
about a mile long and has an average width of nearly half a mile. 
The three larger ones were known as Morton's, Breed's, and Bunker's 
hills. Each of them is associated with the battle. Morton's hill was 
35 feet high and near the point where the British landed. Upon its 
side they formed their lines. Breed's hill was 62 feet high, and upon 
it Colonel Prescott built the redoubt. Bunker's hill, from which the 
name of the battle was taken, was no feet high, and nearest Charles- 
town Neck, which is an isthmus connecting the peninsular with the 
mainland. The "Neck" was narrow, and so low that at the highest 
tides the water flowed over it. As the Americans had no vessels it 
was the only way by which their troops reached the hills or retreated 
from them. Those hills, by their height and proximity to Boston, if 
properly fortified, would command that city and render its hostile 
occupancy impossible. To that work Colonel Prescott was detailed. 
It is stated that he was to have had 2,000 men, but that later it was 
ascertained that there were intrenching tools for only one half that 
number. They were ordered to report for duty at sunset of that day 
on Cambridge common. This force was made up of about 300 men 
from his own regiment, 250 each from the Massachusetts regiments 
commanded by Colonels Frye and Bridges, and from 120 to 200 men 
from Connecticut commanded by Captain Knowlton. 

When they were ready to march it was past nine o'clock in the even- 
ing. President Langdon of Harvard college, who had been elected 
only the year before from the pastorate of the North church in Ports- 
mouth, himself an ardent patriot, invoked the blessing of Almighty 
God upon that little band of citizen soldiers and the cause they repre- 
sented. They then marched, and about eleven o'clock crossed the 
Neck to Bunker's hill. Here the men were first informed of the duty 
for which they had been detailed. The intrenching tools had pre- 
ceded them. It is unknown whether Prescott had verbal or writ- 



New Hampshire at Bunker Hill. 7 

ten orders. No copy of them has ever been found. It is gener- 
ally supposed that the committee of safety and the council of war in- 
tended to have Bunker hill fortified, and it is virell known that Gen- 
eral Putnam was earnestly in favor of it. Colonel Prescott, however, 
said he had been ordered to fortify Breed's hill and that he should 
obey his orders. Many historians say Breed's hill was fortified by mis- 
take, but whether the mistake was in the orders or in the interpreta- 
tion of them is not stated. 

Some time had been consumed in deciding which hill should be 
selected, and it was nearly midnight before Colonel Gridley marked 
off the lines of the proposed redoubt. The size of the redoubt is va- 
riously stated from 70 feet to 132 feet square and some authorities give 
its size as 7 by 8 rods. Probably it was not square and had one pro- 
jecting and two retreating angles. From it, running in a nearly north- 
east direction, was a breastwork which was intended to extend to some 
marshy ground not easily passable. It was a bright, starlight night, 
and the men worked with pick, bar, and spade, and an energy born 
only of experience in labor and the consciousness of a just cause. 
They were not paid in shillings and pence, but in the hope for a free 
land, happy homes, and a government administered by rulers of their 
own selection. It is small wonder then, that in the four hours before 
dawn they had thrown up an intrenchment which was a surprise to 
the British and a credit to their skill and efficiency. 

As their new-born fortification was kissed by the rising sun, the 
guns of the warship Lively, anchored in the Charles river, opened 
fire upon them. Through all the forenoon the work continued on the 
redoubt and breastwork. Just before noon they laid down the intrench- 
ing tools and rested for the impending fight. When they marched 
from Cambridge they took only one day's rations, which were ex- 
hausted. They had Httle to quench their thirst, and the reinforce- 
ments and suppUes promised did not appear. It is no wonder they 
felt that they had been abandoned by those in command, and it re- 
quired all of Prescott's influence and authority to keep the men within 
the fortifications. He had sent for relief and reinforcements, but 
neither came. All through the forenoon, upon one pretext or another, 
the men had dropped away, and when, near noon, General Putnam 
rode up and decided to remove the intrenching tools to Bunker hill, 
many of Prescott's men improved the opportunity to secure a service 
which would remove them from the place of special danger. Few, if 
any, of them returned to duty. Whether they even remained to erect 
intrenchments on Bunker hill seems doubtful. However that may be, 



8 New Hampshire at Bunker Hill. 

the tools they had taken were left on that hill, and nearly all of them 
were captured by the British. 

About 600 feet in the rear and to the east of the redoubt was a rail 
fence which extended toward the Mystic river. To defend it and pre- 
vent a flank movement by the British, Colonel Prescott had detailed 
Captain Knowlton and the Connecticut men. Between the redoubt, 
or breastwork, and the fence, was an open space, undefended. Here 
six cannon were subsequently placed, but, in consequence of a blunder 
in sending ammunition too large for them, and the inefficiency, or 
worse, of the officers in command, they were of little service, and 
were all captured but one. Captain Knowlton was busy at the rail fence. 
He and his brave men commenced to fortify at once. The fence had 
a stone wall base, and, above it, posts with two rails. Near by was 
another fence, which they moved close to the one with the stone base, 
and filled the space between with grass, which lay in windrows and 
cocks on the adjacent newly mown fields. 

Prescott continued to appeal for supplies and reinforcements. He 
even sent one of his trusted captains to General Ward to represent his 
weakness and the absolute necessity for fresh men. A little after noon 
Lieutenant-Colonel Wyman, of Colonel Stark's regiment, arrived with 
a detachment of 200 men, and probably was assigned to duty at the 
redoubt and breastwork. Possibly other orders of like character were 
issued to some of the Massachusetts regiments, but there seems to be no 
sufficient proof that they arrived and participated in the battle. Later, 
orders were issued to Colonels Stark and Reed to march with their 
whole regiments. Stark was at Medford and Reed near Charlestown 
Neck. It was a less distance from Cambridge to the Neck than to 
Stark's camp, and therefore the orders must have reached Reed earlier 
than Stark, and, as he was much nearer the battle ground, he unques- 
tionably arrived there first. When he came he joined Captain Knowl- 
ton at the rail fence, and helped complete the defenses there. When 
Colonel Stark came with the remainder of his regiment he took 
his station at the rail fence to the left of Reed. Thus the Americans 
awaited the attack of the British who had not been inactive. 

The booming guns of the Lively awoke the British in Boston. 
When they discovered that the provincials had occupied and fortified 
the hill they were to have taken possession of on the next day, they 
were surprised and indignant. Possibly their anger was heightened by 
the feeling that their purposes had been betrayed, and that the army 
they affected to despise had stolen a march upon them. General Gage 
called a council of war. It was decided to attack the provincials at 



New Hampshire at Bunker Hill. 9 

once, and to land for that purpose on Morton's point. It is certain 
that, looking at the redoubt from Copp's hill in Boston, the practised 
eye of the veteran British general saw that it could be easily flanked 
along the river bank, and probable that he concluded that the provin- 
cials would either run or that they would be captured without much 
loss on his part. It is stated, also, that General Gage was of the 
opinion that it would be hazardous to land either from the Charles or 
the Mystic river in the rear of the redoubt, thus putting his troops 
between the forces in the redoubt and the main army at Cambridge. 

At that time, and for several hours afterwards, the rail fence had 
not been occupied or strengthened, and the stone wall on the banks of 
the Mystic was not erected until after the British had landed. The 
timely arrival of the New Hampshire regiments, and the hasty defenses 
erected by them and the men of Connecticut changed all this, as we 
shall see. 

General Gage ordered something over 2,000 men for the attack. 
They marched with ammunition, provisions, blankets, and artillery to 
Long wharf, where they embarked in barges ard moved toward their 
landing place. Meanwhile the vessels of waj , taking advantage of 
the tide, moved nearer to the shore and swept the grounds between 
the redoubt and Morton's point to dislodge any troops prepared to 
resist their landing, and enfiladed the Neck to prevent reinforcements 
coming to the aid of the Americans. 

It must have been a beautiful yet strangely sad sight that clear June 
day to have seen those barges moving in pairs and carrying on their 
errand of oppression and death the soldiers in their scarlet uniforms ; 
to have observed the glistening bayonets and the polished cannon, all 
of which seemed to be teeming with life and energy. To hear the in- 
cessant cannonade from the ships added to the awe and terror of the 
scene. It is not surprising that men who had never been in a battle 
were excited and faint hearted at such a crisis — the wonder is that they 
remained to quit themselves like men and gain the respect of those 
who had derided and despised them. 

It was considerably past noon when the British landed without 
opposition. They were under the command of General Howe. Having 
examined the American defenses he asked for reinforcements, and 
while waiting for their arrival many of his soldiers dined for the last 
time. During this delay their cannon were placed in position, when 
it was discovered that the guns, which were six pounders, had been 
supplied principally with ammunition double their caliber. Thus it 
happened that the field artillery on both sides was nearly useless. 



lo New Hampshire at Bunker Hill. 

In the American camp great excitement prevailed. Bells were 
rung and drums beaten. At Cambridge there was more confusion 
than on Breed's hill, where the men were in the immediate presence 
of the enemy. At that time there were on the hill the Connecticut 
men at the rail fence, the two hundred New Hampshire men under 
Lieutenant-Colonel Wyman, either at the breastwork or the redoubt, 
probably the latter, and in the redoubt or behind the breastwork 
whatever was left of the Massachusetts troops under Colonel Prescott. 
Colonel Reed of New Hampshire arrived with his men about two 
o'clock in the afternoon, and took position at the rail fence. On the 
bank of the Mystic river, extending from low water to the fence, was 
a strip of unprotected shore which the British general intended to oc- 
cupy by a flank movement which would place part of his veterans in 
the rear of the fence, which, being at the same time assaulted in front, 
could no longer be held by the Americans. The same flank move- 
ment would, when successful, render the redoubt no longer tenable. 

Upon receipt of his final orders Colonel Stark hastened to the 
front from Medford with the remainder of his regiment. As he passed 
along the side of Bunker hill his skilled eye took in the situation with 
its imminent dangers, and he at once placed his men in the open 
space along the river which General Gage intended to utilize. As 
there were no fortifications there he ordered his men to pile up stones 
from the fence to the water's edge, which they did as quickly as pos- 
sible. 

Meanwhile the British reinforcements had arrived, and their troops 
were formed in three columns — one to attack the redoubt, one the 
rail fence in front, and the other to attempt the flank movement 
along the river, where Stark had posted his men and erected the 
stone barricade. For this latter service the choicest of the British 
troops had been assigned. The three columns moved to the attack 
with the steadiness of veterans and the precision of a formal parade. 
They began firing while at a considerable distance from the defenses, 
and, as their aim was high, inflicted shght damage. The Americans, 
on the contrary, were ordered to reserve their fire and to aim low. 
They were excellent marksmen, and knew that their safety depended 
upon the accuracy of their muskets. They waited until the attacking 
party was only eight rods distant, when a blaze of fire issued from the 
American lines which staggered the veterans, killing and wounding 
many of them. They continued to advance until met by a second 
discharge, even more deadly than the first, when they broke and fled 
down the hill. They were soon rallied and led to the assault again, 



New Hampshire at Bunker Hill. ii 

and again received such a sliower of bullets that no troops could stand 
against it. They ran from the field, many of them to the water's 
edge at the Point, where they had landed. Never had there been 
braver assault, and never had undisciplined yeomen made braver de- 
fense. 

Could our men have been reinforced by the fresh troops which lay 
behind the hill, or even could they have been supplied with ammuni- 
tion to take the place of that which had been expended, the victory 
would have been complete and many prisoners taken ; but, alas, no 
troops came to the rescue of those who had so brilliantly defended 
themselves, and their pouches and cartridge boxes were not re- 
plenished. They made over the few artillery cartridges which re- 
mained, and with hardly powder enough to give each man one load 
more they patiently, yet anxiously, awaited the next and final assault. 

It was with difficulty that the British officers rallied their men. But 
discipline prevailed, and again their lines were formed. They had 
discovered the unprotected space between the breastwork and the 
rail fence, and, practically abandoning the attempt to force a passage 
along the river where Stark held the key to the situation, they made 
an assault upon the redoubt, breastwork, and open space, and carried 
each at the point of the bayonet. Our men had expended their am- 
munition, and had scarcely twoscore bayonets with which to meet 
the onslaught. Many of them clubbed their guns and fought until 
hope had fled, and they were ordered to retreat. The men at the 
rail fence were not so hard pressed, and, with more coolness and or- 
der than could have been expected, they protected the retreat over 
Bunker hill and across the Neck. In this service they lost more men 
than while in their defenses. The British followed our troops to the 
Neck, but did not attempt to cross it, or dare to risk a battle with 
the army encamped at Cambridge, 

Nominally the British had gained a victory, but their losses were 
nearly two and a half times greater than those of the Americans. A 
few more battles like this one would have ruined the British army, and 
left the Americans disciplined and strengthened in numbers, courage, 
and efficiency. The British were undeceived and appalled ; the Ameri- 
cans were surprised that they had withstood the royal veterans so 
successfully, and, though disappointed and defeated, they felt that 
their cause was not hopeless, that their defeat was temporary only, 
and that victory would come with greater efficiency in the several de- 
partments of their army. The actual victory was with the enemy, the 
moral effect was ours. 



12 New Havipshii'e at Bu?iker Hill. 

Two days before the battle Washington had been elected com- 
mander-in-chief of the continental army, had received his commission 
on the very day of the battle, and first heard of it when he arrived in 
New York, on the way to Cambridge to assume command. When told 
that the colonists stood firm he is said to have exclaimed: "Then the 
liberties of our country are secure." 

General Ward in a general order thanked "the officers and soldiers 
who behaved so gallantly at the late action in Charlestown," and as- 
sured them that "we shall finally come off victorious and triumph over 
the enemies of freedom and America." 

General Gage wrote Lord Dartmouth, "The trials we have had 
show the rebels are not the despicable rabble too many have supposed 
them to be . . . they intrench and raise batteries ; they have en- 
gineers. . , . The conquest of this country is not easy." 

Franklin exultingly cried, "England has lost her colonies forever." 

Bunker hill is America's Thermopylae. 

At first it was the expression of disaster and defeat. A quarter 
century later it was the synonym of patriotism and glory, and the 
Americans engaged there, and their partisans, were boasting the 
honor of service and the distinction of command. This contention, 
honorable in itself, became in some instances personal and bitter. 
However much this may be regretted, it elicited historical facts then 
unrecorded, and preserved many documents which otherwise might 
have been lost or destroyed, until now it seems quite improbable that 
any valuable official papers or new information concerning the battle 
or those engaged in it will be discovered. 

The adherents of Putnam and Prescott have been so persistent and 
so prejudiced, not to say intentionally unfair, that the just claims of 
New Hampshire have been pushed aside, and even judicious writers 
of history have failed to award to Stark and Reed and their men the 
service and honor to which they are certainly entitled. 

In no partisan or contentious spirit you gave me an invitation to 
speak to you to-day upon " New Hampshire at Bunker Hill," and I 
should fail in my purpose and be untrue to your desire should I set 
down aught in malice, or claim anything for our state which truth and 
justice do not sustain. 

For several years Massachusetts and New Hampshire were united 
under one government, and later the same royal governor i-uled both. 
The people of each colony were of the same ancestral stock, had the 
same associations, customs, principles, laws, and religion. In fact, 
little, if anything, except colonial boundaries, separated them. They 



New Hampshire at Bunker Hill. 13 

were brothers residing on separate homesteads. There had been some 
differences of opinion about boundary lines, but they had been settled, 
and peace and good will prevailed. So it happened that when the 
British made their raid on Lexington and Concord with undisguised 
hostile intent, destroying property and killing peaceful citizens whose 
only offense was that they loved liberty and home, the men of New 
Hampshire by a common impulse, without organization or govern- 
mental authority, left their business and families and assembled in arms 
before Boston, where they found the intrepid Stark awaiting them. 

In those days of slow communication and slower transportation it 
was nearly a month — not until May 17th — before our provincial con- 
gress attempted to organize our soldiers into companies and regi- 
ments, commission the necessary officers, and furnish them with sup- 
plies and munitions of war. 

In the meantime some of our men joined Massachusetts regiments 
already organized, others organized themselves, and all reported to 
General Artemas Ward for orders and service. 

What part had New Hampshire in the service and glory of Bunker 
hill? 

In the first place, let it be remembered that all the troops New 
Hampshire had before Boston were in the battle. The same cannot 
be said of either Massachusetts or Connecticut. Next, that no word 
has been written or uttered against the conduct or bravery of any 
New Hampshire officer or man engaged in that battle. The same 
cannot be spoken of the entire service of either of the other colonies. 
Thus far, at least, has history and tradition done justice to New 
Hampshire. 

On this point Bancroft says : " The little handful of brave men (in 
the redoubt) would have been effectually cut off, but for the unfailing 
courage of the provincials at the rail fence and the bank of the Mystic. 
They had repulsed the enemy twice ; they now held them in check 
till the main body had left the hill. Not till then did the Connecti- 
cut companies under Knowlton and the New Hampshire soldiers 
under Stark quit the station which they had nobly defended." 

Frothingham says the New Hampshire troops " fought with great 
bravery." All contemporary literature bears similar testimony. But, 
while no one has defamed their patriotism or valor, yet the number of 
New Hampshire men at Bunker Hill and their service there have been 
persistently minimized, and in other regards our state has not received 
the full credit and honor to which it is entitled. History, uninten- 
tionally, I trust, has failed to express with accuracy the great service 



14 New Hampshire at Btmker Hill. 

rendered by our troops. Facts, if not suppressed, have been unfortu- 
nately omitted, the result of which has been to magnify the service of 
Massachusetts and exalt the reputation of Prescott or Putnam, and 
orators and biographers in their zeal have become prejudiced contro- 
versialists and even bitter partisans. It has been truthfully said " No 
other engagement is involved in so much obscurity, perplexity, and 
controversy." 

New Hampshire men have had little part in those controversies. 
There is glory enough for all. New Hampshire desires her just share of 
it only, and disclaims any intention to detract from the legitimate credit 
to which others are entitled. She seeks her own, and claims nothing 
which cannot be sustained by as clear and convincing proofs as the 
records of the past produce. 

Colonel Prescott, who undoubtedly was the only commander at the 
redoubt, in a letter to John Adams dated August 25, 1775, gives a 
brief account of the battle, and dismisses the service of New Hamp- 
shire men in these words : " There was a party of Hampshire, in con- 
junction with some other forces, lined a fence at the distance of three- 
score rods back of the fort, partly to the north." That unfortunate 
sentence seems to have been the first of sundry statements ignoring, 
unconsciously, let us hope, the great service of our men who saved 
the day from a fatal and disgraceful rout. 

The "party of Hampshire" was several times greater than Colonel 
Prescott said in that same letter he had in the fort when the attack 
began. The " party of Hampshire" saved Prescott and all his men, 
upon the first attack by the British, from being flanked and taken 
prisoners, or from shameful flight from the fortifications they had 
erected during the night and that forenoon. The " party of Hamp- 
shire" saved Prescott and his men from probable annihilation, when, 
upon the third attack, they were driven from their intrenchments and 
ran for their lives. Had not the "party of Hampshire," with more 
of military precision and prescience than the Massachusetts men 
demonstrated, covered their retreat, it is not probable that Prescott 
would have been spared to refer to his services on that day. None 
of us have any but the kindest feelings toward Colonel Prescott. We 
all honor him and revere his memory ; but it is high time that credit 
should be given Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire 
according to their several achievements in the battle. 

One more example of injustice to our troops must sufiice. This 
one is from a historian of such reputation that we are astounded at 
his statement. Bancroft says: "After the British had landed, and 



New Hampshire at Bunker Hill. 15 

just before they advanced, a party of New Hampshire levies arrived 
led on by Colonel John Stark, vs^ho, next to Prescott, brought the 
largest number of men into the field." 

New Hampshire " levies," forsooth ! Who issued the conscription? 
Who executed it upon the freemen of New Hampshire? The God of 
battles may have done both when he implanted in the men, women, 
and children of New Hampshire an imperishable love of freedom, and 
with it enough of generous patriotism to inspire our men, each with 
his own equipments, without orders, without organization, and with- 
out the official sanction of our state, to rush to the aid of their breth- 
ren of Massachusetts in the struggle for liberty and justice. If ever 
in the history of freedom there was a spontaneous uprising to defend 
individual and collective rights against tyranny or oppression, it is 
found in the voluntary assembly of New Hampshire men at Medford, 
Massachusetts, coming alone or by twos and threes, and gathering 
around the veteran Stark, who started alone as soon as he heard of 
the affair of Lexington and Concord, and, spreading the news and 
asking volunteers, reported for duty to General Ward in person, and 
offered the services of those who might rally to his standard, around 
which 800 men came in two days, and then, by the processes of a 
town-meeting, organized themselves into a regiment and elected their 
officers, their number being so rapidly increased that in a few days 
fifteen companies had been formed, and all before the state authori- 
ties had taken any action whatever. This unsolicited uprising of our 
forefathers must be held to have been unequaled in the annals of 
men. 

If they were " levies," let us remain silent with uncovered heads to 
contemplate the unmeasured glory which would have been theirs had 
they been inspired by the generous spirit of patriotic service. As 
their sons, it is our duty to them, our duty to state and country, our 
duty to the truth of history, our duty to freedom and justice, and to 
all who love heroism, patriotism, and self-sacrifice, to insist that full 
credit shall be given the citizen-soldiers of New Hampshire, who 
exceeded in numbers and equaled in efficiency and bravery all others 
actually engaged with the enemy at the redoubt, breastwork, rail 
fence, and stone wall which constituted the defenses assaulted by the 
British. As has been stated, the bravery of our troops is universally 
admitted. 

General Stark is reported to have said the New Hampshire men 
were undisciplined and inexperienced. That is undoubtedly true, but 
that they were quite as well disciplined as those who held the re- 



1 6 New Hampshire at Bunker Hill. 

doubt is attested by numerous writers and by tlie undisputed facts of 
the engagement. One writer has said : "The courage and conduct of 
the provincials that opposed the light infantry (the New Hampshire 
troops) saved their co-patriots who were overpowered and obliged to 
retreat from the fort, and who must othei-wise have been cut off, as 
the enemy, but for such opposition, would have been instantly upon 
the back of the redoubt." 

Bradford, in his history of the battle of Bunker hill, published in 
1825, says : "The troops at the rail fence were closely engaged with a 
column of the British, when those at the redoubt were obliged to re- 
treat. They fought with great bravery, and had hitherto prevented 
the advance of the enemy, whose plan was to force their way and turn 
this flank of the provincials. Here the New Hampshire men, under 
Colonels Stark and Reed . . . gave proofs of a firmness and courage 
which richly entitled them to the glory of a victory." 

It is stated, in a report of a committee of the Massachusetts pro- 
vincial congress, "that the retreat was conducted with more regular- 
ity than could be expected of troops, who had been no longer under 
discipline, and many of whom never before saw an engagement ; and 
that the retreat of the men from the redoubt would have been effect- 
ually cut off had it not happened that the flanking party of the enemy 
was checked by a party of our men at the rail fence, who fought with 
the utmost bravery." 

Colonel Sargent, who commanded a Massachusetts regiment into 
which the three extra companies of Stark's regiment were transferred 
some weeks after the battle, wrote: "These two regiments — 
Stark's and Reed's — did all that was done that day of any consequence 
although the fatigue party stood their ground better than could be ex- 
pected after a hard night's labor." 

General Carrington, in his History of the Battles of the American 
Revolution, says : "By a resistance prolonged as long as their powder 
held out, they — the New Hampshire and Connecticut troops — afforded 
opportunity for the fugitives from the redoubt to make good their re- 
treat. Then they also fell back in no precipitate flight, but with 
a fair front and a steadiness worthy of their brave resistance." 

It has already been stated that when the yeomanry of New Hamp- 
shire rushed to the aid of their brethren of Massachusetts they were 
without organization. Their government had taken no action, and 
many of them were in favor of enlisting in the Massachusetts regi- 
ments then organized and in the field. This was done by a consider- 
able number. Col. George C. Gilmore, special commissioner of our 



New Hampshire at Bunker Hill. 17 

state, made a very careful and exhaustive examination of the known 
records pertaining to the battle, and in his report to Governor Tuttle 
gave the name, residence, company, and regiment of all those proven 
to have been citizens of New Hampshire who were at Bunker hill. 
Among them 210 were enrolled in regiments of Massachusetts. 

There is nothing which emphasizes the unorganized condition of the 
provincials surrounding Boston at the time of the battle of Bunker 
hill more than the unfortunate fact that there never have been reliable 
statistics showing exactly the regiments and parts of regiments en- 
gaged in the battle, or the number of men any of the regiments 
actually took into the fight. Colonel Prescott's regiment is supposed 
to have had 432 men enrolled. Three hundred of them marched with 
him to erect the redoubt. How many of his entire command remained 
to fight is unknown. Colonel Frye is presumed to have had 488 men 
enrolled, and about 250 in the detachment under Colonel Prescott. 
Colonel Frye did not accompany them. Colonel Bridge had 460 men 
enrolled, and it is supposed about 250 of them marched under Pres- 
cott to Breed's hill. These parts of three Massachusetts regiments, 
and about 200 men from Connecticut, constituted the force of 1,000 
men who marched to Breed's hill the evening preceding the battle, 
and built the redoubt. 

There were 117 New Hampshire men in Colonel Prescott's regi- 
ment, including the full company of 59 men from Hollis under Cap- 
tain Dow, and from the number of them killed or wounded it is 
fair to presume that all, or nearly all, of them were in the fight. To 
assume that 100 of them were engaged with the enemy would not 
be unreasonable. And by just proportion of the enrolled men to 
those in the detachment, of the 53 New Hampshire men in Colonel 
Frye's regiment, 27 were in the battle. There were 10 New Hamp- 
shire men in Colonel Bridge's regiment, and by similar computation 
there must have been 6 of them in his detachment actually in the 
battle. There were 3 New Hampshire men in the companies of 
Colonel Gridley's regiment known to have been on the field. It is 
almost absolutely certain, therefore, that there were not less than 
136 New Hampshire men in Massachusetts regiments actually en- 
gaged in the battle. In this computation I have claimed nothing 
from other Massachusetts regiments in which New Hampshire men 
were enlisted, for the reason that it is not probable those regiments, 
or any part of them, were in the fight ; and because, even if in the 
battle, it is unknown how many men each furnished. 

At the time of the battle New Hampshire had only two organized 



1 8 New Hampshire at Bunker Hill. 

regiments before Boston. Both of them were in the fight at Bunker 
hill, and were the only regiments there in their entirety. All the 
other commands were composed of details from one or more regi- 
ments. Colonel Reed's regiment consisted often companies. Two 
of them had just been added from Stark's regiment, leaving him thir- 
teen companies. Each company when full had 62 men. 

We are fortunate in having a return of Reed's regiment, issued by 
Adjutant Peabody June 14, 1775, three days before the battle. It is 
complete on all points, and is decisive of the number in that regiment. 
There were 488 " effective men fit for duty." He also reports 149 as 
"sick, absent, unfit, and on command." Of that number 62 had 
not joined the regiment, 51 were "on command," that is, they were 
under service orders, as is shown by Colonel Reed's letter of June 15, 
1775, to the committee of safety at Exeter, in which he says : "I got 
my men into good barracks and then raised my guard, consisting of 
one captain, two lieutenants, four sergeants, four corporals, and forty 
privates," being 51 in all. It is presumed these 51 men were part of 
the 488 men " fit for duty." If not, his effective force should be in- 
creased by that number. Seven men were called deserters, i officer 
and 20 privates were on the sick list. The other 8 persons are prob- 
ably included in some of the other designations. Therefore, Reed's 
regiment then actually consisted of 488 "effective men fit for duty," 
and 21 men on the sick list or 509 men in all, being an average of 50 
men to each company. It will be observed that the regiment was 
healthful, as only one man in twenty-four was sick. 

Colonel Reed, by order of June 12, 1775, from General Ward, was 
required "to quarter his regiment in the houses near Charlestown 
Neck and keep all necessary guards between his barracks and the 
ferry and on Bunker hill." We have seen that 51 men were neces- 
sary for that purpose. At the time of the battle there was no neces- 
sity for guards at the ferry or on Bunker hill, but, if we presume that 
the original number was detailed for guard duty, then Colonel Reed 
took 437 men to the rail fence. 

The number of men under Colonel Stark is not so easy to deter- 
mine. No official rolls or returns of his regiment, either just before or 
after the battle have been found. As we have seen, Colonel Stark was 
elected colonel by the men who joined him at Medford. They were 
New Hampshire men, but had not been regularly enlisted by its au- 
thority. Colonel Stark was not pleased with the action of the pro- 
vincial congress of New Hampshire in placing General Folsom in 
supreme command of the New Hampshire regiments. For a time he 



New Hampshire at Bunker Hill. 19 

neglected to make returns of his regiment through General Folsom, 
and even refused to do so. This is much to be regretted, for un- 
doubtedly an official statement of the number of his men at Bunker 
hill would redound to the honor of the state he served so faithfully. 
Colonel Stark wrote, under date of May 18, 1775, from Medford to 
the New Hampshire provincial congress, that he had 584 men ex- 
clusive of drummers and fifers, and that " the remainder are hourly 
expected." 

The New Hampshire congress voted June 3, 1775, that " ten com- 
panies of 62 men each, of the regiment now at Medford in Province 
of Massachusetts, be the first or oldest regiment." Colonel Stark 
styled it "The First Regiment in New Hampshire for the defense of 
America." General Dearborn, in his account of the battle published 
in the Port Folio, says Stark had 13 companies, and speaks of Colo- 
nel Reed's as a small regiment. General Folsom, under date of June 
23, 1775, in a letter to the committee of safety, says : " Stark's regi- 
ment still consists of 13 companies." 

Henry Parkinson, quartermaster of Colonel Stark's regiment, drew 
rations July 2, 1775, for 13 companies aggregating 679 men. If to 
this number we add the 60 men the regiment lost at Bunker hill, we 
have 739 men, or, if we concede that one third of the wounded men 
were on duty again, we have 724 as the enrollment of Stark's regiment 
the day of the battle. If from that number we deduct, as in Colonel 
keed's regiment, one man in 24 for sickness, we shall have 30 men 
on the sick list, leaving 694 men fit for duty. If from that number 
we deduct a guard for the camp we should then have as near as pos- 
sible the number of men of Stark's regiment ready for active service. 
As his men did no guard duty outside of their own camp, the number 
necessary for that purpose would not exceed 25. If we deduct that 
number we find that there were 669 of Stark's men actually in the 
battle. Practically the same result is indicated by the fact that when 
a detail was made June 22, 1775, from the two regiments " to labor on 
Winter Hill," 50 men were taken from Reed's regiment and 70 men 
from Stark's. As Reed had 488 men, if the proportion was main- 
tained. Stark would have 683 men. This indicates that the number 
already suggested is not too large. Again, Reed had 437 men fit for duty 
in 10 companies. Stark's companies, as his regiment was formed, 
would naturally be larger than those under Colonel Reed, but if 
Stark's 13 companies were each of the same number, then under that 
computation Stark would have 568 men fit for duty and actually en- 
gaged in the battle. 



20 New Hampshire at Bunker Hill. 

Again, Colonel Stark originally had 15 companies in his regiment. 
Before the battle he transferred the companies commanded by 
Captain Thomas, with 46 men, and Captain Whitcomb, with 59 men 
fit for duty, to Colonel Reed. There were, therefore, 105 men in the 
two companies fit for duty, being an average of 52^ for each company. 

The returns show there were 5 men not fit for duty in Captain 
Thomas' company, and 1 1 in Captain Whitcomb's company, which 
were not reported with the "effective" men in those companies. 
Counting these there would have been 121 men in the two companies, 
or an average of 60 J men per company. If we reckon only 52^ 
men per company, then Stark had in his regiment of 13 companies 
682 effective men fit for duty, and about 657 men actually in the 
battle. Three companies of Stark's regiment were transferred to Col- 
onel Sargent's Massachusetts regiment a few weeks after the battle. 
These companies numbered 54, 64, and 72, respectively, an aggregate 
of 190, averaging 63 to a company. At that average the 13 com- 
panies would have numbered 819 officers and men. 

Colonel Gilmore concludes from the names he has found and tabu- 
lated that Stark's regiment numbered 842. Each of these two find- 
ings corroborates the other. In neither is there any deduction for 
absence, sickness, or other causes. 

Again, in pursuance of a general order dated July 3, 1775, a re- 
turn of the army was made, and New Hampshire reported three regi- 
ments with 98 commissioned officers and staff, 160 non-comissioned 
■officers, 1,201 men present fit for duty, 115 sick, present, 20 sick, 
absent, 49 on furlough, and 279 on command, a total of 1,922, with 
an average of 640 men to each regiment. As Stark's regiment then 
■consisted of 13 companies, and undoubtedly with more men to each 
company than the other regiments, it is probable that his command 
actually exceeded 800. 

Once more, the official returns show that Colonel Reed's command 
■sustained a total loss in the battle of 33, and that Colonel Stark's regi- 
ment had 60 men killed or wounded. If Colonel Reed had a total loss 
of 33 from 437 men actually in the battle, then Stark's effective force, 
with a loss of 60, ought to have been not less than 797, which is more 
than one hundred men more than I have claimed for him. 

Every computation made from the best data obtainable justifies my 
finding that of Stark's regiment not less then 657 men were actually 
engaged with the enemy. If to this number we add the 437 already 
stated to have been in Reed's regiment and at the rail fence, and the 
136 New Hampshire men in the Massachusetts regiments, we have a 



New Hampshire at Bunker Hill. 21 

total of 1,230. If from this number we deduct the 19 men in the two 
New Hampshire regiments who were not residents of the state, we 
have 1,211 as the number of the officers and men from our state who 
actually participated in the fight which made Bunker hill forever 
memorable in the annals of freedom. 

Mr. Isaac W. Hammond, our late state historian, in his statement 
of our forces at Bunker hill (given in volume 14 of our State Papers ) 
arrives at nearly the same result by a somewhat different computation. 
He makes our effective force there 1,230. It seems certain that our 
state had over 1,200 men in the fight and that every man did his duty. 

In making these computations I have not claimed anything for 
which I have not found a great preponderance of evidence. We 
have been credited so little, in comparison with our just deserts, that 
I have been very cautious not to claim even full credit for the 
service of our state on the first battle-field of the Revolution, in an 
engagement which startled the despotic nations of the world and gave 
new hope and strength to all who aspired to freedom and independ- 
ence, not only in America, but wherever an individual dared to ques- 
tion the divine right of kings to control and command him ; wherever 
a free spirit looked up to the Father of all and thanked him for the 
aspirations which make life trustful and happy. 

Rev. Increase N. Tarbox, in his life of General Putnam, says : 
" We conclude Colonel Reed led 442 men to Bunker hill." That is 
5 more men than my computation gives him. Mr. Tarbox further 
says : ' ' We judge it safe to say that Stark and Reed brought 900 
men to Bunker hill,'" and adds : "We are satisfied that New Hamp- 
shire had not less than 960 men on that field. Some would place the 
number higher. What is of vastly greater importance, they were men 
who knew how to find their way to the front and did not run away. 
They fought it out to the last moment." He credits Stark with 458 
men, only 16 men more than he concludes Colonel Reed led to the 
rail fence. No one who carefully examines the records can join him 
in that low estimate. To produce it he allows Stark only 10 compan- 
ies, one of which he details to camp duty. It is absolutely certain that 
Stark's regiment at the time of the battle was composed of 13 com- 
panies. 

It is true that Frothingham, in his list of regiments at Bunker hill, 
assigns only 10 companies to Stark's regiment, and gives the names 
of the captains commanding them. But it is equally true that each of 
the 13 companies sustained losses of killed or wounded at Bunker 
hill — many of them having men both killed and wounded — and that 



22 New Hampshire at Bunker Hill. 

the three companies omitted by Frothingham were commanded by- 
Captains Scott, Stiles, and Towne ; that there were at least 4 men 
killed and 4 wounded in Captain Scott's company and i man killed and 2 
wounded in each of the companies commanded by Captain Stiles and 
Captain Towne. The original muster roll of Captain Towne's com- 
pany is now among the valued possessions of our historical society. 

Colonel Stark said his whole regiment was engaged, and that ought 
to be conclusive on that point. Again, if only 10 of the 13 compan- 
ies marched to the rail fence, why have we not even a single line of 
proof to sustain that allegation? Is it probable that Stark when 
ordered to march with his regiment left three companies in camp, or 
that any three companies of his regiment would have been willing to 
be left behind when the place of duty and of honor was at the front ? 
If Mr. Tarbox had made his calculations to include 13 companies 
in Stark's regiment, and made no allowance for more men per com- 
pany than he credits Colonel Reed, even then he would have found that 
Stark led at least 589 men into the battle, which is only 68 men less 
than I claim. The greater average of men per company in Stark's 
regiment amply accounts for even more than that number. Frothing- 
ham says, " Colonel John Stark's regiment was large and full." 

It is probable that few, if any, over 2,000 Americans were actually 
in the fight. Of this number Connecticut furnished about 200, Mass- 
achuseetts about 600, and New Hampshire about 1,200. Some 300 
or 400 more Massachusetts men were on the hill, and many of them 
assisted in erecting the redoubt and breastwork but were not in the 
battle. 

Mr. Tarbox further says, "We have the full conviction that the 
tirne will come when the whole nation will give the honors of the battle 
of Bunker Hill largely to the common soldiers of New Hampshire, 
who, more than any other men, fought it. . . . The men at the 
redoubt who patiently endured and suffered to the end are worthy of 
all honor. But the battle was fought chiefly by the soldiers of New 
Hampshire, whose muskets killed and wounded probably two out of 
three in that list of ten hundred and fifty-four which General Gage re- 
ported to the home government." General Stark, years after the 
battle, told General Wilkinson that in front of his regiment '* the dead 
lay as thick as sheep in a fold." 

The Massachusetts and New Hampshire men under Prescott who 
remained to fight, and so bravely defended the redoubt and breast- 
work, are entitled to especial praise, for they not only proved their 
bravery in battle but demonstrated their ability to endure hunger and 



New Hampshire at Bunker Hill. 23 

thirst that they might fight. There were no greater heroes at 
Bunker hill than they. 

It is certain there was no authorized commander of the whole 
battle. Colonel Prescott unquestionably commanded at the redoubt, 
Colonel Stark was the senior in command and in experience at the 
rail fence, and probably exercised more general authority there than 
any other officer, though he repudiated the idea that there was any- 
one in general command. Levi Woodbury, speaking for New Hamp- 
shire on the seventy-fifth anniversary of the battle and in response to 
a toast, is reported to have said that Stark told him ' ' that there was 
no commander of all the American troops on this hard-fought day, and 
that most of the officers who conducted men there, all being moved by 
one common impulse, and to one common end, fought the common 
enemy much as they deemed best, each acting pretty much on his own 
hook." General Putnam was active a large part of the day, and 
urged reinforcements with much energy. It is doubtful if he partici- 
pated in the battle itself personally or attempted to direct any of the 
fighting. Gen. James Wilkinson said of the battle : "I consider it not 
only one of the most splendid combats but the most impressive fea- 
ture of the Revolution." General Heath says in his Memoirs: "Per- 
haps there never was a better fought battle than this, all things con- 
sidered." 

As a result of it the British never attempted to assault the army be- 
fore Boston, and eventually evacuated the town. They learned to 
fear the provincials, and through fear came respect. No battle of the 
Revolution accomplished more for the patriot cause. Without it Ben- 
nington, Saratoga, and Yorktown might not have been possible. 
That New Hampshire bore so conspicuous and honorable a part at 
Bunker hill confers renown upon our state, and in itself is a eulogium 
upon the brave men whom this society especially represents. We 
have a just pride in their work, achievements, reputation, and glory. 
It is a sacred duty devolved upon us to perpetuate before our people 
and in history an accurate and loving account of their patriotic and 
faithful service. To that duty we consecrate ourselves in the love of 
country and liberty, and with the high resolve to become worthy the 
illustrious ancestry which gave our state such distinction that Wash- 
ington wrote our great civic leader, Meshech Weare, that " the par- 
ticular and spirited exertions of the state of New Hampshire, to ful- 
fil the objects which we have in view, cannot but meet the warmest 
applause of every lover of his country. It has mine in a high degree, 
but not more than it deserves." 



